We construct an algebraic pseudorandom function (PRF) that is more efficient than the classic Naor-Reingold algebraic PRF. Our PRF is the result of adapting the cascade construction, which is the basis of HMAC, to the algebraic settings. To do so we define an augmented cascade and prove it secure when the underlying PRF satisfies a property called parallel security. We then use the augmented cascade to build new algebraic PRFs. The algebraic structure of our PRF leads to an efficient large-domain Verifiable Random Function (VRF) and a large-domain simulatable VRF.
In a nutshell, a PRF is indistinguishable from a truly random function. We give precise definitions in the next section. The fastest PRFs are built from block ciphers like AES and security is based on ad-hoc interactive assumptions.
In 1996, Naor and Reingold [28] presented an elegant PRF whose security can be deduced from the hardness of the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) defined in the next section. The Naor-Reingold PRF takes as input an m-bit string b = b1 . . . bm ∈ {0, 1} m and a secret key (h, x1, . . . , xm) and outputs We define this PRF more precisely in Section 4.1. Evaluating this PRF amounts to m modular multiplications plus one exponentiation. This PRF was recently generalized by Lewko and Waters [24] to work in groups where DDH may be easy, but where a weaker assumption called k-linear may hold. While this has clear security benefits, there is a cost in performance compared to Naor-Reingold.
The algebraic structure of the Naor-Reingold PRF leads to several beautiful applications that are much harder to construct with generic PRFs built from block ciphers. Some examples include Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) [22] , oblivious PRFs (used for private keyword search [19] and secure computation of set-intersection [23] ), and distributed PRFs [28] , to name a few. Another algebraic PRF due to Dodis and Yampolskiy [18] (based on the signature scheme from [10] ) also has many useful applications. However, this PRF is only known to be secure when the domain is small (i.e. polynomial size).
Our results. We describe a new algebraic PRF that has the same domain as Naor-Reingold, but requires fewer multiplications to evaluate and uses shorter private keys. For parameters and n our PRF takes inputs (u1, . . . , un) in Z n along with a key (h, x1, . . . , xn) and outputs F (h, x1, . . . , xn), (u1 . . . un) := h 1/w (2) where w := n i=1 (xi + ui) .
For a domain of size 2
m evaluating this PRF requires a factor of log 2 fewer multiplications than (1) to compute w. Since computing w often takes roughly the same time as the final exponentiation, evaluating this PRF is about twice as fast as evaluating the Naor-Reingold PRF. The secret key is shorter by a factor of log 2 . We prove security of this PRF from the -DDH assumption defined in the next section. The larger gets the stronger the assumption becomes and therefore one should keep small. Setting = 16 or 256 for example is a reasonable choice.
Techniques. We prove security of the PRF by developing a PRF composition theorem that generalizes the classic cascade construction of Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [6] . The cascade construction, shown in Figure 1(a) , constructs a PRF with a large domain from a PRF with a small domain and is the basis for the NMAC and HMAC PRFs [5, 4] .
Unfortunately, the cascade construction is insufficient for our purposes because it requires the output of the underlying PRF to be atleast as long as the secret key. We therefore define the augmented cascade (shown in Figure 1 (b)) which eliminates this requirement by using supplemental secret information in every block. The augmented cascade can be applied directly to PRFs whose output is much smaller than the secret key. Suprisingly, security of the augmented cascade does not follow from security of the underlying PRF. We therefore develop a sufficient condition on the underlying PRF, called parallel security, that implies security of the augmented cascade.
Armed with the augmented cascade theorem, we build our large-domain PRF by plugging the Dodis-Yampolskiy small-domain PRF [18] into the augmented cascade. To prove security, we prove that the Dodis-Yampolskiy PRF is parallel secure. As a short aside, we show the power of the augmented cascade theorem by using it to quickly prove security of the Naor-Reingold and Lewko-Waters PRFs.
Verifiable Random Functions. The algebraic structure of the PRF in (2) enables many of the same applications as the Naor-Reingold PRF. In Sections 6.2 and 7 we show how to convert this PRF into a Verifiable Random Function (VRF) with a large domain in groups with a bilinear map. A VRF, as defined in [26] , is a PRF that also outputs a proof that it was evaluated correctly. VRFs give signature schemes where every message has a unique signature. They were also used to construct e-cash schemes [3, 2] .
Hohenberger and Waters [22] recently constructed an elegant VRF with a large domain. Our VRF is a little less efficient, but surprisingly is based on a weaker assumption. Their construction requires an assumption where the problem instance has size O(mQ) where m is the size of the domain and Q is the number of adversarial queries. We only require a problem instance of size O(m). Our security proof makes use of admissible hash functions as in [9] . We also describe a large-domain simulatable VRF (as defined in [15] ).
PRELIMINARIES

Pseudorandom Functions
We begin by reviewing the definition of pseudorandom functions [20] . Informally, a pseudorandom function is an efficiently computable function such that no efficient adversary can distinguish the function from a truly random function given only black-box access.
More precisely, a PRF is an efficiently computable function F : K × X → Y where K is called the key space, X is called the input space, and Y is called the output space. Security for a PRF is defined using two experiments between a challenger and an adversary A. For b ∈ {0, 1} the challenger in Exp b works as follows.
When b = 0 the challenger chooses a random key k ∈ K and sets f (·) := F (k, ·). When b = 1 the challenger chooses a random function f : X → Y . The adversary (adaptively) sends queries x1, . . . , xq in X to the challenger and the challenger responds with f (x1), . . . , f (xq). Eventually the adversary outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
For b ∈ {0, 1} let W b be the probability that A outputs 1 in
As usual, one makes the terms "efficient" and "negligible" precise using asymptotic notation by equating efficient with probabilistic polynomial time and equating negligible with functions smaller than all inverse polynomials. Here, we use non-asymptotic language to simplify the notation.
Complexity assumptions
Notation. In this section and in Section 4.2 it is convenient to use vector notation defined as follows. Let G be a group of prime order p with generator g.
• for vectorsḡ = (g1, . . . , gn) ∈ G n andx = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
For a scalar g ∈ G define gx := (g x 1 , . . . , g xn ).
• for a matrix A = (ai,j) ∈ Z and for a scalar g ∈ G define
We will also use [k] to denote the set {1, . . . , k}.
The k-linear assumption. Let V k be the linear subspace of Z k+1 p containing all vectors orthogonal to (−1, 1, 1, . . . , 1); its dimension is k. A vector v = (v0, . . . , v k ) is in V k if v0 is the sum of the remaining coordinates. When k = 1 a vector v = (v0, v1) is in V2 if and only if v0 = v1. For an algorithm A define
Definition 2. For k ≥ 1 we say that the k-linear assumption holds for the group G if for all efficient algorithms A the advantage LIN
The 1-linear assumption is identical to the standard Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in G and we write DDH adv [A, G] to denote LIN (1) adv [A, G] . For k = 2 we obtain the decision linear assumption defined in [12] . For larger k we obtain the generalized linear assumption defined in [29, 21] .
It is not difficult to show that if the k-linear assumption holds for G then so does the -linear assumption for all > k. It is believed that the larger k is the weaker the assumption becomes. In particular, the 2-linear assumption may hold in groups where the 1-linear assumption (a.k.a DDH) is false.
. The k-DDH assumption states that g 1/x is indistinguishable from a random group element given g pow(x,k) . More precisely, for an algorithm A define
where g, h are uniform in G and x is uniform in Zp. When x = 0 we define g 1/x to be 1 in G.
Definition 3. For k ≥ 1 we say that the k-DDH assumption holds for the group G if for all efficient algorithms A the advantage DDH
is negligible. This assumption was previously used in [8, 18] where it was called k-DDHI. The 1-DDH assumption implies the standard DDH assumption. Moreover, for k > 1 the k-DDH assumption implies the -DDH assumption for < k.
We obtain a hierarchy of complexity assumptions from the k-linear and k-DDH assumptions:
The assumptions becomes stronger as one moves from left to right. In the generic group model this hierarchy can be shown not to collapse [11] .
A useful lemma. We will need the following lemma from [13] (Lemma 1). Let Z n×m p be the set of n × m matrices over Zp and let Rk1(Z n×m p ) be the set of matrices in Z n×m p of rank 1. In addition, let G be a group of order p with generator g. Let A0 be uniform in RK1(Z n×m p ) and A1 be uniform in Z n×m p . For an algorithm A :
The following lemma shows that when DDH is hard in G, no efficient adversary can distinguish a rank 1 matrix in the exponent from a random matrix in the exponent. 
Bilinear maps
We briefly review the necessary facts about bilinear maps and bilinear map groups [27] . Let G and GT be two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p and let g be a generator of G. A bilinear map is a map e : G × G → GT with the following properties:
1. Bilinear: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z we have e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab . We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed efficiently and there exists a group GT and an efficiently computable bilinear map e : G × G → GT as above. Note that e(·, ·) is symmetric since e(g a , g
The k-BDH assumption.
1/x is indistinguishable from a random group element in GT given u and g pow(x,k) . More precisely, for an algorithm A define
where g, u are uniform in G, x is uniform in Zp, and γ is uniform in GT .
Definition 4. For k ≥ 1, we say that the k-BDH assumption holds for the group G if for all efficient algorithms A, the advantage BDH
3. THE AUGMENTED CASCADE
The cascade PRF
The cascade pseudorandom function, defined in [6] , constructs a secure PRF with domain X n from a secure PRF with domain X. The cascade construction is shown in Figure 1(a) .
More precisely, let F : K × X → K be a secure PRF. We define the cascade of F denoted F * n : K × X n → K as input: key k0 ∈ K, and (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n for i = 1, . . . , n do:
Here the output range of F must equal the key space K. Cascade is the basis for the NMAC and HMAC message authentication codes [6, 4] . Cascade is a generalization of the GGM PRF [20] , which can be viewed as a method to convert a PRF with a 1-bit domain into a PRF with an n-bit domain. The security of the cascade construction is stated concretely in the following theorem, which is shown in [6] .
Theorem 2. For every q-query PRF adversary A attacking F * n there exists a q-query PRF adversary B attacking F such that
where B runs in about the same time as A.
Augmented Cascade PRF
The cascade construction works with a PRF F whose output is as long as the PRF key. When constructing algebraic PRFs, the starting point is often a PRF F whose output is shorter than required for cascade. We therefore need to augment the output of F so that its output is a valid key for F .
Consider a PRF F operating on the following spaces:
Notice that the key for F is a pair in (S, K) while the output is in K and therefore not a complete key. In the augmented cascade we append a fresh random string to the output to make it into a valid key. We define the augmented cascade, denotedF * n , as a functionF * n : (S n × K)
The function's domain is X n and its keys are tuples of the form (s1, . . . , sn, k) ∈ S n × K. The augmented cascade is shown in Figure 1 (b) and is defined as follows input: key (s1, . . . , sn, k0) ∈ S n × K, and value (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n for i = 1, . . . , n do:
Security. Unfortunately, the augmented cascade can be insecure even if the underlying function F is a secure PRF. For example, F can be a secure PRF even if it ignores the part of the key in K (i.e. F only uses the part of the key in S). In this case, since we ignore ki (for all i), the last block of the augmented cascade construction is evaluated independently of the first n − 1 blocks. Thus, the resulting augmented cascade constructionF * n ignores the first n − 1 input blocks and hence cannot be a secure PRF.
In the next two sections we establish sufficient conditions for security of the augmented cascade.
Parallel composition security
In Theorem 3 below we will show that the augmented cascade is a secure PRF provided that the underlying function F satisfies a property we call parallel security. This property says that F remains a secure PRF when the adversary has access to multiple instances of the function with different but related keys.
For a function F : (S × K) × X → K and an integer q > 0 we define q related keys (s, k1), . . . , (s, kq) where s ∈ S and k1, . . . , kq ∈ K. These keys are related since they all share the same s. We say that the function F is q-parallel secure if the resulting set of q functions is indistinguishable from q random independent functions. More precisely, let F (q) be the function:
Here i ∈ [q] selects the key (s, ki) to be used in the function F . Thus, F (q) emulates q functions F whose keys are (s, ki) for i = 1, . . . , q.
The function F need not be q-parallel secure even if it is secure as a PRF. For example, as above, a secure PRF F : (S × K) × X → K that ignores the part of the key in K (i.e. only uses the S part of the key) is clearly not 2-parallel secure. Even when S is small (e.g. S = {0, 1}) the function F may not be 2-parallel secure even though F is a secure PRF.
Security of the augmented cascade
We now prove security of the augmented cascade provided that the underlying PRF is parallel-secure.
Theorem 3. If F is q-parallel secure then the augmented cascadeF * n is a secure PRF against q-query adversaries.
In particular, for every q-query PRF adversary A attackingF * n there is a q-query PRF adversary B attacking F (q) such that
The proof uses a hybrid argument similar to the proof of the original cascade [6] , but is sufficiently different to require its own proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. Given an adversary A we construct an adversary B as required. The intuition for the construction of B comes from the following sequence of n + 1 hybrid experiments between a challenger and adversary A. In hybrid i, the challenger replaces the first i stages of the augmented cascade with a truly random function, while the last n − i stages are carried out as in the standard augmented cascade.
More precisely, for i = 0, . . . , n define the challenger in hybrid experiment Pi as follows:
setup: the challenger chooses a random function f : X i → K and random keys s1, . . . , sn in S.
queries: to respond to a query (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n from A do:
send kn to A For i = 0, . . . , n, let Wi be the probability that A outputs 1 in hybrid number i. Observe that in hybrid P0 the adversary A interacts with the functionF * n while in hybrid Pn the adversary interacts with a random function f : X n → K. Therefore,
It follows by the standard hybrid argument that there exists a t ∈ [1, n] such that
We construct a q-query PRF adversary B such that
Combining (3) and (4) proves the theorem. Adversary B emulates the challenger in hybrid Pt or Pt+1. This requires B to emulate a random function f : X t → K. To do so, it is convenient to describe B using an associative array T that maps elements of X t to numbers in {1, . . . , q}. Initially the array T is empty. . . , q} B queries its F (q) challenger at (xt+1, u) and obtains some kt+1 ∈ K note: kt+1 is either random in K or is equal to F ((s, k * u ), xt+1) for some random key (s, k * u ) chosen by B's challenger.
for j = t + 2, . . . , n do:
(finish the cascade) kj ← F ( (sj, kj−1), xj) send kn to A eventually A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. B outputs the same bit and terminates.
Since A makes at mostueries the variable u is always in the range [1, q] and therefore all of B's queries to its challenger are in the proper range.
When B's challenger emulates a random function then B emulates a Pt+1 challenger to adversary A. When B's challenger emulates F (q) then B emulates a Pt challenger to adversary A. Therefore (4) holds which completes the proof of the theorem.
EXISTING ALGEBRAIC PRFS
We briefly review two existing algebraic PRFs in the literature and explain how their security neatly follows from the security of the augmented cascade construction.
The Naor-Reingold PRF
We start with the Naor-Reingold PRF [28] . Let G be a group of order p and let f : (Zp × G) × {0, 1} → G be the function
Plugging f into the augmented cascade we obtain the following PRF whose domain is {0, 1} n and range is G:
To show that FNR is a secure PRF it suffices to show that f is parallel secure. Naor and Reingold do so implicitly in their proof. We state this in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If the DDH assumption holds for the group G then the function f defined in (5) is q-parallel secure for all q polynomial in the security parameter.
Proof. To prove that f is q-parallel secure we need to show that f (q) is a secure PRF. The function f (q) has domain {0, 1} × [q] which is a set of size 2q. Hence, it suffices to show that enumerating the 2q outputs of f (q) gives a secure pseudorandom generator. In particular, all we need to show is that
is a secure PRG, assuming DDH holds in G. This is a direct application of the random self reduction of DDH [28] . For completeness, we briefly review the reduction.
Let A be an algorithm that distinguishes the output of G on a random seed from a random tuple in G 2q . We build an algorithm B that breaks DDH in G. Given a tuple (g, h, u, v) as input, algorithm B chooses random a1, . . . , aq and b1, . . . , bq in Zp and computes
Naor and Reingold show that if (g, h, u, v) is a DDH tuple then (6) is distributed as the output of G on a random seed. If (g, h, u, v) is a random tuple then (6) is random in G 2q . Algorithm B runs A on the tuple (6) and outputs whatever A outputs. Then
] as required. The running time overhead of B is polynomial in q.
Combining Theorem 3 with Lemma 4 proves that the function FNR is a secure PRF whenever DDH holds in G.
The Lewko-Waters PRF
Lewko and Waters construct a PRF from the k-linear assumption [24] . While their PRF is not as efficient as the PRF of Naor and Reingold, their construction can remain secure in groups where DDH is false.
Let G be a group of order p. Let k > 0 be a parameter and define f : (Z
Recall that the notation A · h is defined in Section 2.2. Plugging f into the augmented cascade we obtain the following PRF whose domain is {0, 1} n :
To show that FLW is a secure PRF it suffices to show that f is parallel secure. Lewko-Waters do so implicitly in their proof. We state this in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. If the k-linear assumption holds for the group G, then the function f with parameter k defined in (7) is qparallel secure for all q polynomial in the security parameter.
Proof sketch. As in the proof of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that
is a secure pseudorandom generator, assuming k-linear holds in G. To prove this, one first shows that this G is a secure PRG when A is a random row vector in Z k p . This uses the random self reduction of the k-linear problem described in [24] . Then one extends this to a k × k matrix using a hybrid argument over the k rows of the matrix A. Both ingredients are given in the Lewko-Waters proof of security.
Combining Theorem 3 with Lemma 5 proves that the function FLW with parameter k is a secure PRF whenever the k-linear assumption holds in G.
A NEW ALGEBRAIC PRF
Our starting point is a secure PRF due to Dodis and Yampolskiy [18] with a domain of size for some small . The PRF is proven secure under the -DDH assumption. Recall that we use [ ] to denote the set {1, . . . , } and consider the PRF f : (Zp × G) × [ ] → G defined as follows:
As before we define h 1/0 = 1. Dodis and Yampolskiy prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6 ([18]). Suppose the -DDH assumption holds
in G. Then f is a secure PRF provided the domain size is polynomial in the security parameter.
In particular, for every PRF adversary A there is an -DDH algorithm B such that
where T is the maximum time for exponentiation in G.
Plugging f into the augmented cascade we obtain a PRF whose domain [ ] n has exponential size. The resulting PRF is defined as follows:
As discussed in the introduction, this PRF is more efficient than the Naor-Reingold PRF since it processes log 2 bits per block rather than just one bit per block. The cost of this increased efficiency is reliance on a stronger assumption, namely -DDH.
Theorem 7. The PRF defined in (9) is secure assuming the -DDH assumption holds in G.
To prove the theorem it suffices to show that f defined in (8) is parallel secure; namely that f (q) is a secure PRF for all polynomial q. We state this in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. If the function f defined in (8) is a secure PRF and the DDH assumption holds in G then f is q-parallel secure for all q polynomial in the security parameter.
In particular, for every PRF adversary A there are adversaries B1 and B2, whose running time is about the same as A's, such that
Note that the DDH assumption is implied by the k-DDH assumption and hence the DDH assumption used in Lemma 8 does not add an assumption beyond the one already used to prove that the underlying f is a secure PRF.
Proof of Lemma 8. Our goal is to show that f (q) is a secure PRF. We present the proof as a sequence of three games between a challenger and a PRF adversary A that attacks f (q) . For i = 0, 1, 2, let Wi be the probability that A outputs 1 at the end of Game i.
Game 0. The challenger in this game behaves as a standard challenger presenting the adversary with an oracle for the pseudorandom function f (q) with a random key (s, h1, . . . , hq).
Game 1. The challenger in this game starts by choosing a random function u : [ ] → G. It also chooses random r1, . . . , rq in Zp. Now, given a query (x, i) ∈ [ ] × [q] from the adversary, the challenger responds with u(x) r i . We show that Games 0 and 1 are indistinguishable, assuming f is a secure PRF. In particular, there is a PRF adversary B1, whose running time is about the same as A's, such that
Adversary B1 interacts with a PRF challenger for f and plays the role of an f (q) PRF challenger for A. Adversary B1 works as follows: choose random r1, . . . , rq in Zp.
given a query (
issue a query to B1's challenger with input x and obtain y in response. respond on A with y r i .
finally, output whatever A outputs.
When B1's challenger emulates an oracle for the function f with random key (s, h) it responds to query x with y = h 1/(s+x) . For i = 1, . . . , q define hi := h r i . Then B1's response to A's query for (x, i) is simply h
which is precisely f (q) ( (s, h1, . . . , hq), (x, i) ). Hence, in this case B1 emulates a Game 0 challenger for A.
When B1's challenger emulates a random function u : [ ] → G then B1's response to A's query for (x, i) is simply u(x) r i which is precisely how a Game 1 challenger would respond. These two arguments prove (10), as required.
Game 2. The challenger in this game presents the adversary with an oracle for a random function
We use Lemma 1 to argue that Games 1 and 2 are indistinguishable assuming the DDH assumption holds in G. In particular, there is a DDH algorithm B2 such that
Let (x1, i1), . . . , (xq, iq) be A's queries to its challenger. Recall that in Game 1 the challenger responds to A's queries using a random function u : X → G and random r1, . . . , rq ∈ Zp. Let A ∈ Z q×q p be the matrix A := (risj) 1≤i,j≤q . Clearly A has rank 1.
In Game 1 the adversary is given q entries in the matrix g A ∈ G q×q . In Game 2 the adversary is given q random values in G which we treat as q entries in a random q × q matrix in G. By Lemma 1 there is an algorithm B2 that satisfies (11), as required.
Summary. Combining (10) and (11) shows that
as required.
The proof of Theorem 7 follows by combining Theorem 3 with Lemma 8, which shows that the function F with parameter is a secure PRF whenever the -DDH assumption holds.
VERIFIABLE RANDOM FUNCTIONS
Verifable Random Functions, introduced by Micali, Rabin, and Vadhan [26] are PRFs where the party holding the secret key can produce a non-interactive proof that the PRF was evaluated correctly. The proof should not interfere with the pseudorandom properties of the PRF.
We give two VRF constructions from the augmented cascade. In this section, for a parameter , we use the DodisYampolskiy small-domain VRF to construct VRFs for a domain of size n for constant n. Security is based on the n -BDH assumption in bilinear groups. In comparison, the core Dodis-Yampolskiy construction requires the n -BDH assumption for a VRF on a domain of size n . In Section 7 we construct a VRF for a domain of size 2 m for arbitrary m from the O(m)-BDH assumption. Our construction makes use of admissible hash functions introduced in [9] .
Hohenberger and Waters [22] recently constructed an elegant large domain VRF from the Naor-Reingold PRF for domain of size 2 m for arbitrary m. Security against a Q-query adversary relies on the O(mQ)-BDHE assumption, where t-BDHE is an assumption of the same flavor as the t-BDH assumption. While the efficiency of our VRF is worse than that of Hohenberger and Waters, the required complexity assumption is weaker: O(m) vs. O(mQ). The proof techiques for the two constructions are quite different. Hohenberger and Waters use the pile-up approach of Waters [30] while we use admissible hash functions [9] .
Other VRFs include Abdalla et al. [1] who give a construction using the m-wBDH assumption in blinear groups for a domain of size 2 m . The construction is limited to polynomial size domains since security degrades exponentially in m. Early VRFs outputting one bit were given by Lysyanskaya [25] and Dodis [17] based on stronger assumptions.
Definition of VRFs
A VRF is an efficiently computable function F : K × X → Y equipped with three algorithms:
• Gen(1 λ ) outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk) for a security parameter λ.
• Prove (sk, x) computes F (sk, x), π(sk, x) , where π(sk, x) is a proof of correctness.
• Verify(pk, x, y, π) verifies that y = F (sk, x) using the proof π.
Security for a VRF is defined using two experiments between a challenger and an adversary A. For b ∈ {0, 1}, the challenger in Exp b works as follows:
The challenger chooses a random key (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 λ ). The adversary (adaptively) sends queries x1, . . . , xq in X to the challenger who responds with F (sk, xi) and proof π(sk, xi) for i = 1, . . . , q. The adversary issues a special challenge query x * . If b = 0, the challenger responds with F (sk, x * ). If b = 1, the challenger chooses random y ∈ Y and responds with y. Eventually the adversary outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 6. A VRF is said to be secure if it satisfies the following properties.
Pseudorandomness: For every efficient adversary
A, VRF adv [A, F ] is a negligible function.
2. Verifiability: For (y, π) ← Prove(sk, x), Verify(pk, x, y, π) = 1.
3.
Uniqueness: no values of (pk, x, y1, y2, π1, π2) satisfy Verify pk (x, y1, π1) = Verify pk (x, y2, π2) = 1 for y1 = y2.
Building a VRF using augmented cascade
We construct a secure VRF with domain of size n using the n -BDH assumption and the augmented cascade. Evaluating the VRF takes n multiplications and one exponentiation. Our VRF is built from the augmented cascade using the Dodis-Yampolskiy VRF as the underlying function. The Dodis-Yampolskiy VRF uses pairings and outputs elements in GT while its key uses elemets in G. We therefore need to slightly tweak the augmented cascade to compensate for the difference between GT and G, but this is easily done. The resulting VRF is defined as follows:
Algorithm Gen(1 λ ): Fix a group G of prime order p with a bilinear pairing. Choose random generators g, u ∈ G and random values s1, s2, . . . , sn ∈ Zp. Set ti := g s i for i = 1, . . . , n and output the keys pk = (g, u, t1, . . . , tn), sk = (g, u, s1, . . . , sn).
On input sk and x = (x1, . . . , xn) output
Algorithm Prove(sk, x): This algorithm outputs F (sk, x) along with a proof π as follows: for i = 1 to n, compute
and output the proof π := (π1, π2, . . . , πn) ∈ G n .
Algorithm Verify(pk, x, y, π): First verify that the proof π contains legal encodings of elements in G. Next, check that e(πi, g
where π0 := g. Finally, check that e(πn, u) = y, where y is the output of the VRF. Verify returns 1 iff all the checks are satisfied.
Proof of VRF security
Theorem 9. Suppose the n -BDH assumption holds in a bilinear group G (of order p). For n = O(1) and = poly(λ), the VRF defined in section 6.2 is secure.
Proof. Verifiability of the VRF is straightforward. Uniqueness follows from the group structure: for any input there is only one group element in G that is a valid output, and moreover, it is not possible (even for an unbounded adversary) to devise a valid proof for another element. It remains to prove pseudorandomness.
Intuition. Given a n -BDH instance, enumerate all possible inputs for each of the n input blocks. Consider a n × matrix where the (i, j) th entry corresponds to the monomial (x + j − b * i ), for randomly chosen b * i . Any query from the adversary can be seen as a path through the matrix that visits exactly one cell in each column (corresponding to each input block). Set up the generator in the simulation (by multiplying out all the monomials described above), with n special cells, referred to as "mines" (which are used to construct the secret keys), such that any query that does not visit all the mines can be answered. To do this, place place the mines in the (i, b * i ) th cell. With a probability of −n , the aversary's challenge query will visit exactly each and every mine, and distinguishing this from random is equivalent to solving n -BDH.
We formalize this intuition below and in Section 7 extend this idea, with error-correcting codes, to construct a VRF with a large domain.
For the sake of contradiction, assume there exists an adversary A for which VRF adv [A, F ] is non-negligible. We construct an algorithm B that breaks the n -BDH assumption in G with non-negligible advantage.
Input: Algorithm B is given a tuple (g, u, g x , . . . , g
n +2 × GT and is to determine if y is e(g, u)
1/x or drawn randomly from GT. 
Next, B constructs the public key values
. . , n and sends A the public key pk = (h, u, t1, . . . , tn).
The secret key values s1, . . . , sn corresponding to this public key (and are unknown to B) are:
Responding to Oracle Queries: Without loss of generality, assume A never repeats a query. Consider the i th query
i contributes a factor z to the denominator in the definition of F . As long as b (i) = b * , B successfully answers the query, as follows.
Construct n polynomials,
. . , n. To compute proofs, B computes:
for j = 1, . . . , n and sets π = (π1, . . . , πn). Finally B computes the function on the query,
B answers the query with F (sk, b (i) ) and π. In the unlikely event that b (i) = b * algorithm B aborts the simulation and outputs ⊥.
Challenge: Eventually, A outputs a messageb on which it wants to be challenged. Ifb = b * , then B aborts and outputs ⊥. Ifb = b * , B proceeds as follows. Since A is a VRF adversary, it can distinguish between e(h, u)
1/x n and a random element in GT with VRF adv [A, F ]. Now, recall that:
Because p(z) is divisible by z n−1 but not divisible by z n :
for some ρ = 0 and coefficients ρi. Now, using the challenge y, B computes:
If y R ← GT, then y * is distributed randomly in GT. However, if y = e(g, u)
1/x , then, y * is F (sk, b * ) = e(h, u)
1/x n . Therefore, it suffices B to answer A's query with y * .
Guess: Algorithm A makes more queries, if required, to which B responds as before, and then finally outputs a guess bit b ∈ {0, 1}. B outputs b as its guess.
Abort probability. B aborts when the final query is not equal to b * . Since b * is chosen at random from [ ] n , this happens with probability −n . B might abort earlier if one of the earlier queries is b * , but that implies that the final query is not equal to b * which is already considered before. Therefore,
As in [18] , we choose [ ] such that = poly(λ), and n = O(1). Now, any efficient adversary that has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing the VRF from a truly random function can be used to construct an adversary B that breaks n -BDH with non-negligible advantage. Hence, under the n -BDH assumption, the VRF described in section 6.2 is a secure VRF.
VRFS WITH LARGE INPUT DOMAINS
In this section, we show how to construct a secure VRF with an input domain of {0, 1} m for arbitrary m. Security depends on the O(m)-BDH assumption. Evaluating the VRF requires about 32m multiplications and one exponentiation. Our construction uses error correcting codes with a large minimum distance. 
where HDist(·, ·) denotes the hamming distance between the codewords (the number of co-ordinates where the two codewords differ).
We need the following lemma from [14] . In particular, for the construction of the VRF it suffices to take = 4. Therefore, Corollary 11. For any positive integer m, there exists a (m, n, d)4-error correcting code with d > n/2 and n = 32m.
VRF construction
Algorithm Gen(1 λ ): Choose a group G of prime order p with a bilinear pairing. Select random generators g, u ∈ G, random values s1, s2, . . . , sn ∈ Zp and set ti = g s i . Let n = 32m. Choose a suitable (m, n, n/2) 4 -error correcting code H : {0, 1} m → [4] n . The keys are: pk = (G, p, g, u, t1, . . . , tn), sk = (g, u, s1, . . . , sn).
On input sk and a bit string x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) output:
where H(x)i refers to the i th coordinate of H(x).
Algorithm Prove(sk, x): Upon input sk and x output F (sk, x) along with a proof π as follows. For i = 1 to n, compute
. Output the proof:
Algorithm Verify(pk, x, y, π): First verify that π contains legal encodings of elements in G. Next, check that:
where π0 := g. Finally, check that e(πn, u) = y, where y is the output of the VRF. Verify returns 1 iff all the checks are true.
The following theorem proves security of the construction. The complete proof is given in the full version of the paper.
n is a (m, 32m, d)4-error correcting code with d > n/2, the VRF constructed earlier is secure under the 256m-BDH (or equivalently the 8n-BDH) assumption.
Proof Outline. Recall the intuition behind the proof of Theorem 9. Given an 8n-BDH instance, construct an 2n × 4 matrix where the (i, j) th entry corresponds to the monomial (x + j − b * i ), for randomly chosen b * i . In the proof of Theorem 9 the public parameters were constructed to enable the simulator to answer any query that does not visit all 2n mines. An adversary whose special query visits all the mines can be used to solve the 8n-BDH instance. Since the fraction of queries that cannot be answered by the simulator is exponentially small in n (i.e., 8 −n ), this proof technique works only for small n.
In this proof, for a parameter k, we choose a random integer r ∈ [k, n] and modify the public parameters construction to enable the simulator to answer queries only if the query visits no more than r mines. k is chosen so that the challenger fails on a 1/n fraction of all possible inputs with high probability, which can then be used to break the 8n-BDH assumption. This requires k to be O(log Q). To mitigate an adversary forcing the simulator to abort by constructing highly correlated queries, a random code with large minimum distance is used which lower bounds the success probability to at least Ω(1/n) which is sufficient for the simulation.
Simulatable VRFs
Chase and Lysyanskaya [15] introduced simulatable VRFs (sVRF), which they used to convert single-theorem noninteractive zero knowledge (NIZK) to many-theorem NIZK.
Their simulatable VRF, secure under the k-BDH assumption and the subgroup decision assumption (SDA), has a polynomial size domain. We briefly outline how the augmented cascade gives a large-domain sVRF using the same assumptions.
The augmented cascade theorem generalizes to sVRFs and can be used to construct large-domain sVRFs from smalldomain ones, provided the underlying sVRF has parallelsecurity. The simulatability of the sVRF makes it possible to push the hybrid proof of the augmented cascade (Theorem 3) to the settings of sVRFs. We note that this was not possible for VRFs since the simulator cannot provide proofs in the hybrid experiments. Now, plugging the ChaseLysyanskaya sVRF into this augmented cascade, we obtain a large-domain sVRF.
CONCLUSIONS
We presented a generalization of the cascade construction called the augmented cascade. We used the augmented cascade to construct large-domain PRFs from small-domain algebraic PRFs. The augmented cascade provides a unified framework for analysing the constructions of Naor-Reingold and Lewko-Waters. We used the augmented cascade to extend the Dodis-Yampolskiy PRF to a PRF on large domains, resulting in the most efficient algebraic PRF to date.
The new large-domain PRF can be converted into a largedomain VRF in a bilinear group and proven secure based on the m-BDH assumption for some parameter m that depends on the domain size. For small domains the resulting VRF uses a weaker assumption than its Dodis-Yampolskiy origin. We obtain a large domain VRF using error correcting codes. The algebraic structure of these constructions will likely find many applications, as was the case for the Naor-Reingold PRF. As an example, we briefly noted a simulatable-VRF for large domains.
